China-Vatican Relations as Reflected from Shanghai Installation (Part 2)
Lucia Cheung, April 16, 2023
The most crucial concern of Chinese Catholics before and after the Shanghai installation was: Has the Holy See approved it? Like the foreign media, they wanted to see the Vatican issue a statement accusing China of violating the provisional agreement, just like the case of Bishop Peng Weizhao last November. Most media simply use China’s violation of the agreement as headlines to describe the event. So, what is the attitude of the Vatican? Did China really violate the deal?
1. The Holy See’s (No) Reaction to the Installation
Let us study the response of the director of the Holy See Press Office, Matteo Bruni:
“For the moment”, he added, “I have nothing to say about the Holy See’s assessment of the matter.”
On the Agenzia Fides, a subsidiary mouthpiece of the Vatican, its director Gianni Valente also wrote:
According to the initial declarations of intent, the Agreement was supposed to create “the conditions for broader bilateral cooperation.” At the time, the path of gradualism was chosen…When initiating processes, one always takes into account that the path ahead may involve moments of stalemate, difficulties, or the emergence of new problems. Predictions of this kind were made by senior representatives of the Holy See already at the time of the signing of the Agreement…
From the Vatican News’ headline, “Holy See learns of move from media,” and in the report “The Holy See had been informed a few days ago of the decision,” we can smell the dissatisfaction of the Holy See. However, you may be disappointed if you hope to see harsher accusations. Although Bishop Shen is not a favor of the Holy See, the Vatican not making any objections publicly this time, meaning that Shen Bin has passed the test. Since we are all amateur observers without the chance to read the agreement, you may disagree or reject the author’s personal analysis. However, we have to remember Valente, a close friend of Pope Francis, said that an approach of “gradualism was chosen.” It means that the provisional agreement is a step-by-step rather than a comprehensive solution to all problems, even concerning issues related to bishops.
2. “Surprise and Regret” VS “Nothing to Say”
Why does the Holy See have “nothing to say” this time instead of “surprised and regret,” as in Bishop Peng’s installation? We can compare the two responses. In response to Bishop Peng’s case, there are three main points: First, Jiangxi is “a diocese not recognized by the Holy See.” Second, Bishop Peng’s status as “auxiliary bishop of Jiangxi.” Third, the bishop faced “prolonged and intense pressure by the local Authorities.” The Vatican’s opinion of the incident was: “Such an event, in fact, has not taken place in conformity with the spirit of dialogue that exists between the Vatican parties and the Chinese parties and what has been stipulated in the Provisional Agreement on the Appointment of Bishops of 22 September 2018.”
For Point 1, it is known that the provisional agreement is about bishops’ appointments. Dioceses’ geographical jurisdictions overlapped due to the evolution of times; and it is too complicated to resolve in a provisional agreement. Many bishops still have different names affiliated with their dioceses in China’s and the Holy See’s records. Thus, Point 1 is possibly not the key “regret.” Point 2 is about the ordinary bishop being demoted to the status of auxiliary bishop. This happened to Bishop Guo Xijin of Mindong Diocese in 2018, too. It was even the Holy See officials who persuaded him to accept the demotion for the sake of the Church. It is, therefore, no reason to be a problem now. So Point 3 is more likely where the real regret lies.
As we all know, the Vatican signed the agreement because it did not want to see the illicit episcopal ordination anymore. This is related not only to the problems of the creation of more illicit bishops, but also to the conscience conflicts complained about by legitimate bishops who were forced to participate in the ceremony. In addition, one year after signing the agreement, the Holy See issued a document, allowing mainland priests to decide whether to accept civil registration according to their conscience. In other words, freedom of conscience is a prime concern of the Holy See. In fact, the Holy See used precisely the reason of conscience to force China cancelled an illicit bishop ordination in Wuhan in 2011. Therefore, the author subjectively believes the main regret of the Vatican is that Bishop Peng was pressured to take office and boldly guessed that there should be a clause in the provisional agreement that the bishops should not be forced based on freedom of conscience. As for “surprise,” the Vatican is dissatisfied that China did not notify in advance, losing the spirit of dialogue.
3. Why did the Vatican Not React Strongly?
The Vatican’s news report is full of dissatisfaction with Shen Bin’s installation between lines, but the spokesperson’s response is quite restrained. This is understandable. First of all, based on all the events that the Shanghai diocese has gone through in the past decade, especially the July 7 ordination, which embarrassed China before the world, China will definitely insist on choosing its candidate. The Vatican clearly finds that it is difficult to grasp its control of the China Church at this stage.
Furthermore, people need to remember that the China-Vatican agreement is provisional. We cannot expect normal church operations in China. Otherwise, Valente would not have said the senior representatives of the Holy See have already predicted, “the path ahead may involve moments of stalemate, difficulties, or the emergence of new problems.” If the agreement does not state that the transfer of a bishop is not allowed, and as long as the bishop is legitimate, China doesn’t need to gain approval from the Vatican. Thus, it would be inappropriate to say China violates the agreement. You can only blame yourself for not thinking carefully when signing the agreement. Even if the Vatican can exercise its veto power over any transfer, knowing the difficult situation of Shanghai, the Vatican will be unlikely veto China’s favorite candidates again and again, and continue to let such vital diocese remain a vacant see.
More importantly, Bishop Shen is the chairman of the Bishops’ Conference. The recognition of Vatican-appointed bishops must have the signature of “Master Shen” (see Part 1) to get go. If Vatican gives a strong and harsh response, these bishops may have this or that kind of troubles to get ordained or installed during his remaining four years of tenure. What’s more, he can be re-elected to serve for another five years! During the past four years since the agreement was signed, the Vatican could not have all its favored or appointed bishops ordained or installed as expected. The Vatican officials also complained publicly the agreement was not as satisfactory as expected. So, it is not difficult to know the answer to the Holy See’s assessment of the Shanghai installation.
4. The Agreement and the Spirit of the Agreement
China-Vatican relations are still in a negotiation process. We should also look at China’s response. Regarding Bishop Peng’s installation, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian responded last year: “I’m not aware of what you mentioned.” His response obviously avoided the question.
As for the response of Mao Ning, spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 6, she said, “China and the Vatican are in communication over this…and the agreement is in sound implementation. We are ready to maintain contact with the Vatican side to uphold the spirit of the agreement.”
Here we can see some connotations of the China-Vatican interaction from it. First, as the Vatican said, China has notified the Vatican of this decision. Late notification is another matter. Second, the agreement is in sound implementation. If this statement is false, the Vatican should, in its first response, point out that China violated the agreement, as it did in the case of Bishop Peng, rather than having “nothing to say.” Then did China violate the “spirit of dialogue?” “Spirit” is something abstract and difficult to define. For decades, some Church members accused the progressive sect of hijacking the Second Vatican Council with the term “spirit of Vatican II.” How can it be clearly said? Different people could have different interpretations to the word “spirit.” The better option is for the Holy See to remain silent.
However, just as the media worldwide regard the Shanghai installation as another setback for the Holy See, we must be clear about the interactions between the two sides before we can make a judgment. Let’s see the other ordinations or installations in the queue. Vatican’s Foreign Minister Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher confirmed to a Church media in March that “there are negotiations underway for the appointment of other bishops.” Last year, Father Wang Yaosheng of Zhengzhou Diocese and Father Wu Yishun of Mingbei Diocese were elected bishop-elect with high votes. Earlier, a delegation from the Bishops’ Conference visited the two places for coordination. Father Wang is a figure that the Vatican very, very unfavored. Compared with Bishop Shen, who is already a legitimate bishop, the Vatican will try to make every possible move to prevent Father Wang from becoming a bishop at this stage. The postponement of the two ordinations is a compromise from Beijing. As far as the Vatican is concerned, it has both winning and losing in the game. Contrary to what the outside world often thinks — the Vatican is kowtowing to China, the Vatican’s pursuit is “all win” and has never thought of giving up control of the China Church. This explains its dissatisfaction with Shen Bin’s transfer.
Looking into the Future
The agreement renewal in 2022 came smoothly. It has to be so because the Vatican must not repeat the uncertainty and hastiness of the first renewal in 2020 so as not to draw speculation from the outside world and ridicule from opponents. It also allows the Vatican to prepare ahead for the coming two years. The senior Vatican officials will not always be passive this time but will sometimes take the initiative to express dissatisfaction, as in the case of Bishop Peng, and sometimes compromise, as in Shen Bin’s installation, as a negotiation strategy. In other words, the new rounds of negotiations in these two years will be more obvious and exciting than before.
As for what will happen, I don’t have a crystal ball to tell. Two separate news of the year, however, is worth noting. Since the Vatican is prepared to take the initiative, or better to say “dialogue,” a good atmosphere is needed. The Jesuit Pope has a deep affection for Matteo Ricci, but he has not yet been able to visit China to fulfill his wish to pay tribute at Ricci’s tomb. His hope can be accomplished by Bishop Stephen Chow Sau-yan of the Hong Kong Diocese when he leads a delegation to Beijing on April 17.
This visit is based on “the spirit of brotherhood” between the dioceses of Beijing and Hong Kong. The itinerary includes a visit to Matteo Ricci’s tomb, meetings with other local bishops and other relevant units concerning religious affairs. The “other local bishops” are, of course, those of the bishops’ conference and CCPA stationed in Beijing. If the Vatican severely criticizes China now, Bishop Chow’s visit will only be extremely embarrassing. As the first visit to Beijing by a Hong Kong bishop in more than 20 years, will he refuse to meet with religious officials or reprimand Shen Bin in his face? Or conversely, let the officials criticize the Holy See for him to send the message back? This is probably not the mission’s aim expected by the Holy See. Will the Vatican put out another harsher statement regarding the Shanghai diocese only after Bishop Chow returns? According to the media ecology, unless something unexpected happens later, the installation was old news by then, and the Vatican will be happy not to make any further statements.
In September, Pope Francis will visit Mongolia, which has only 1,400 Catholics. As the Russia-Ukraine war continues, is using safer Chinese airspace necessary? It will be the first time after the agreement. If a harsher response on the Shanghai installation turns into an impasse and lingers on, do you still have the nerve to use the airspace? If it was used, the Pope would unlikely accuse China up in the sky, would he? And if he sends greetings to the national leaders according to usual practice, people will feel hypocritical. Whether the airspace is necessary, we may need to consult aviation experts for an answer.
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